



Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554

March 16, 2018

In Reply Refer to:
1800B3-CEG

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In re: WJJS(FM), Roanoke, VA
Facility ID No. 64082
File No. BRH-20110531AKT

WJXX(FM), Appomattox, VA
Facility ID No. 36094
File No. BRH-20110531AGK

WROV-FM, Martinsville, VA
Facility ID No. 37747
File No. BRH-20110531AKB

WSNV(FM), Salem, VA
Facility ID No. 73956
File No. BRH-20110531AKW

WYYD(FM), Amherst, VA
Facility ID No. 74282
File No. BRH-20110531ALB

WSFF(FM), Vinton, VA
Facility ID No. 41635
File No. BRH-20110524ABG

WSNZ(FM), Lynchburg, VA
Facility ID No. 70331
File No. BRH-20110524ABH

**Applications for Renewal
Petition to Deny**

Dear Counsel and Petitioner:

We have before us the above-referenced applications (Renewal Applications) for renewal of the licenses for stations: WJJS(FM), Roanoke, VA; WJXX(FM), Appomattox, VA; WROV-FM, Martinsville, VA; WSNV(FM), Salem, VA; WYYD(FM), Amherst, VA; WSFF(FM), Vinton, VA; and WSNZ(FM), Lynchburg, VA (the Stations). On September 1, 2011, 3 Daughters Media, Inc. (3 Daughters), the licensee of six stations in the Roanoke-Lynchburg market,¹ filed a petition to deny the Renewal Applications (Petition), raising issues related to the divestiture of former Clear Channel Communications, Inc. (Clear Channel) stations held by Aloha Station Trust, LLC (Aloha Trust).² Aloha Trust, licensee of stations WSFF(FM) and WSNZ(FM) (Roanoke Trust Stations), and Capstar TX LLC (Capstar), a Clear Channel subsidiary and licensee of stations WJJS(FM), WJXX(FM), WROV-FM, WSNV(FM), and WYYD(FM) (Roanoke Capstar Stations), filed separate oppositions.³ For the reasons set forth below, we deny the Petition and grant the Renewal Applications.

Background. On January 8, 2008, the Commission granted consent to the transfer of control of Clear Channel from its public shareholders to two private equity funds.⁴ The transaction terminated Clear Channel's grandfathered station combinations, which exceeded the numerical limits set forth in the Commission's multiple ownership rules.⁵ To resolve this issue, Clear Channel applied for Commission consent to assign the excess stations to Aloha Trust, a divestiture trust insulated from the control of beneficiary Clear Channel by means of a trust agreement submitted with the divestiture applications (Trust Agreement).⁶ In the Trust Agreement, Aloha Trust committed to consummate the sales of the Trust Stations "as soon as reasonably practicable" after the transfer of control consummation.⁷ In the *Divestiture Order*, the Commission "encouraged [Aloha Trust] to consummate the sale of all the stations within six months of the [transfer of control] consummation date" and required it to submit a report within six months if Aloha "failed to consummate the sale of all of the [Trust] Stations within six months" setting forth "the reasons . . . why the required sales have not been consummated."⁸

¹ 3 Daughters is the licensee of: WBLT(AM), Bedford, VA; WGMN(AM), Roanoke, VA; WIQO-FM, Forest, VA; WMNA(AM), Gretna, VA; WMNA-FM, Gretna, VA; and WVGM(AM), Lynchburg, VA.

² Clear Channel became iHeartMedia, Inc. in 2014. However, to maintain consistency with the record in this proceeding, we will continue to refer herein to Capstar's parent company as "Clear Channel."

³ On October 3, 2011, Aloha Trust filed an opposition to the Petition (Aloha Trust Opposition). Also on October 3, 2011, Capstar filed an opposition to the Petition (Capstar Opposition) (collectively, Oppositions). On October 24, 2011, 3 Daughters filed a reply to the Oppositions (Reply).

⁴ *Existing Shareholders of Clear Channel Communications, Inc. (Transferors) and Shareholders of Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund VI, L.P., Bain Capital (CC) IX, L.P., and BT Triple Crown Capital Holdings III, Inc. (Transferees)*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 FCC Rcd 1421 (2008) (*Divestiture Order*).

⁵ *Divestiture Order*, 23 FCC Rcd at 1425.

⁶ *Id.* at 1425-27; *see, e.g.*, File No. BALH- 20070619AKA, Exh. 5 (Trust Agreement).

⁷ Trust Agreement, 4(a).

⁸ *Divestiture Order*, 23 FCC Rcd at 1427; Trust Agreement, 4(g).

On July 30, 2008, Clear Channel consummated the assignments of 57 stations (Trust Stations) to Aloha Trust, simultaneously with the transfer of control to the private equity funds.⁹ Subsequently, from 2008 to 2017, Aloha Trust “completed the divestiture, by sale, transfer, and gift, of 43 full service radio stations and three FM translator stations, leaving Aloha Trust today with 14 full-service radio stations.”¹⁰ Aloha Trust has only sold one Trust Station in the Roanoke-Lynchburg market, when, in 2011, it assigned WSNV(FM), Salem, Virginia (WSNV), back to Capstar. This transaction was made possible when the number of stations in the Roanoke-Lynchburg Metro market increased to the point that Capstar was permitted under the multiple ownership rules to acquire an additional station.¹¹

In its Petition, 3 Daughters argues that the trust arrangement between Clear Channel and Aloha Trust, now in its tenth year, contravenes the public interest.¹² Specifically, 3 Daughters contends that, by indefinitely “parking” the Roanoke Trust Stations with Aloha Trust, Clear Channel continues to be the economic beneficiary of more stations than it would be permitted under the multiple ownership rules, while ensuring that “no party will be able to effectively compete with it by becoming the licensee of those stations . . .”¹³ The remedy, according to 3 Daughters, is for the Commission to deny all Clear Channel or Aloha Trust Station license renewals in the Roanoke-Lynchburg market until the two Roanoke Trust Stations have been assigned to third parties.¹⁴

3 Daughters also argues that Clear Channel has improperly prevailed upon Nielsen and BIA to include several stations as “home” to the Roanoke-Lynchburg Metro market in order to “boost[] the market into the tier of stations in which a party may hold an attributable interest in five same-service commercial radio stations.”¹⁵ Consequently, 3 Daughters contends, the Roanoke-Lynchburg Metro market at the time of the WSNV sale improperly included two “dark” or significantly underpowered stations and three stations that had not yet constructed the facilities authorized by their construction permits and thus had no market share.¹⁶ To prevent such market “manipulation,” 3 Daughters requests that the Commission “clarify” that (1) unbuilt construction permits cannot form the basis of an Nielsen Metro market “home” designation and (2) silent stations (or stations operating at significantly reduced power) are not considered part of an Nielsen Metro market for multiple ownership purposes.¹⁷

In the Oppositions, Capstar and Aloha Trust argue that the Petition does not directly address the renewal standard of section 309(k),¹⁸ and is “no more than a thinly disguised and egregiously late attempt to revisit Commission actions that have long ago become final”—*i.e.* Clear Channel’s 2008 divestiture of

⁹ Aloha Trust Opposition, Exh. A at 3; *see also, e.g.*, File No. BTCH-20061212AEU.

¹⁰ *Bi-Annual Report of the Aloha Station Trust, LLC*, submitted to the Commission on July 31, 2017 (2017 Bi-Annual Report), at 4.

¹¹ File No. BALH-20110114AAA. The WSNV assignment was granted on March 10, 2011, and consummated the same day. *Broadcast Actions*, Public Notice, Report No. 47443 (Mar. 15, 2011).

¹² Petition at 2.

¹³ *Id.* at 6-7.

¹⁴ *Id.* at 14.

¹⁵ *Id.* at 12.

¹⁶ *Id.* at 7-13.

¹⁷ *Id.* at 12.

¹⁸ Capstar Opposition at 4; Aloha Trust Opposition at 13.

the Trust Stations to Aloha Trust and Capstar's 2011 reacquisition of WSNV from Aloha Trust.¹⁹ Capstar and Aloha Trust claim that the WSNV reacquisition was consistent with the Trust Agreement and the multiple ownership rules.²⁰ According to Aloha Trust, because the Commission acknowledged in the *Divestiture Order*, that Aloha Trust might not be able to sell all of the Trust Stations within six months, 3 Daughters is "asking the Commission to create a binding legal standard here rather than enforce an existing one."²¹ With respect to 3 Daughter's request for "clarification" of which stations should be counted in a radio market, Capstar argues that this request is advanced in the wrong forum and should be raised instead as part of the Commission's quadrennial review of the media ownership rules.²² Aloha Trust adds that its failure to sell the Roanoke Trust Stations does not mean it has "abdicated its trustee duties and conspired with Clear Channel to warehouse the [Trust] Stations."²³

In its Reply, 3 Daughters argues that Clear Channel's continued interest in more stations than it would otherwise be permitted to own is against the public interest and therefore directly relevant to the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" prong of the Section 309(k)(1) renewal standard.²⁴ 3 Daughters asserts that it is "not seeking reconsideration of the [*Divestiture Order*]; rather it is seeking its enforcement."²⁵ Finally, 3 Daughters explains that it is not seeking reconsideration of the WSNV assignment, but rather a present-day determination of whether 45 stations are rightly counted as participating in the Roanoke-Lynchburg Metro market.²⁶ If the market has fewer stations than Clear Channel claims, 3 Daughters argues, Clear Channel must divest enough stations to bring it into compliance with the numerical limits of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules.²⁷ 3 Daughters also provides further factual support for its claim that Aloha Trust has failed its obligation under the *Divestiture Order* to diligently seek buyers for the Roanoke Trust Stations. Specifically, it alleges that Aloha Trust has not advertised in trade journals or online and that its interactions with potential buyers—including 3 Daughters—have been counterproductive to negotiating a successful sale.²⁸

On February 1, 2016, the Bureau issued a letter of inquiry (LOI) to Aloha Trust, requesting information needed to make an assessment of its "efforts to price, market, and sell the remaining radio station properties assigned to it for the purpose of divestiture."²⁹ Aloha Trust submitted a response to the

¹⁹ Capstar Opposition at 1; Aloha Trust Opposition at 6-7.

²⁰ Capstar Opposition at 4; Aloha Trust Opposition at 7 (claiming that the operation of the Trust Stations and WSNV assignment "fall squarely within the terms of the Trust Agreement").

²¹ Aloha Trust Opposition at 10.

²² Capstar Opposition at 4, n.8; *see also, e.g., 2014 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Second Report and Order, 31 FCC Rcd 9864 (2016).

²³ Aloha Trust Opposition at 12.

²⁴ Reply at 3, 5; *see generally*, 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(1).

²⁵ *Id.* at 4.

²⁶ *Id.* at 6.

²⁷ *Id.* at 6 (stating that "it is not necessarily the case that WSNV(FM) would be the station required to be divested. As a result, the allegation raised by Clear Channel and Aloha Trust that the [Petition] is seeking reconsideration of the WSNV(FM) assignment grant is without any foundation."); *see also* 47 CFR § 73.3555.

²⁸ Reply at 7-9.

²⁹ *Barry A. Friedman, Esq.*, Letter, Ref. No. 1800B3-TSN (Feb. 1, 2016).

LOI on February 29, 2016, which it requested be treated as confidential (LOI Response).³⁰ On July 31, 2017, Aloha Trust also filed the 2017 Bi-Annual Report, explaining, as required, “why the required sales have not been consummated.” In the 2017 Bi-Annual Report and LOI Response, Aloha Trust ascribes its failure to sell the remaining Trust Stations to the nationwide “economic situation” generally, and to the “weak market for broadcast station acquisitions” in particular.³¹ Aloha Trust explains that the market for radio stations “is simply not what it was prior to the 2008 economic downturn.”³² This situation has been exacerbated, according to Aloha Trust, by competition for advertising from “digital medium, centered on the Internet.”³³ Aloha Trust notes that the “more valuable and saleable radio stations in its portfolio” have sold, leaving Aloha Trust with primarily “individual radio stations in smaller markets, which are more difficult to find buyers for.”³⁴ Aloha Trust concedes that, due to the Trust Stations’ pre-existing manner of operations and economies of scale (such as shared studio and transmitter space with Clear Channel stations), “there can be material difference in how the perceived fair market value of these assets is viewed between the selling and purchasing parties.”³⁵ Aloha Trust admits, however, that it has turned down offers for Trust Stations that it believed did not represent “fair market value.”³⁶

Aloha Trust states that, since 2008, it has engaged a media broker, Media Venture Partners, LLC (MVP), to market the Trust Stations to prospective buyers.³⁷ MVP has not auctioned any of the Trust Stations but has entertained offers individually as they have come in.³⁸ MVP alleges that, although 3 Daughters evidenced interest in the Roanoke Station and the MVP and Aloha Trust have been “ready and willing to undertake a transaction with 3 Daughters Media, [] 3 Daughters Media has never presented an offer to the Aloha Trust.”³⁹ In fact, MVP claims that it has not received a “single qualified cash offer to purchase either or both of the Roanoke Trust Stations.”⁴⁰ Although Aloha Trust notes that lack of financing options for buyers is a significant factor in its inability to sell Trust Stations, “owing to its charge, [it] is not in a position to participate in seller-financing for any transaction.”⁴¹ Aloha Trust concludes that “[W]hen there will be a vibrant marketplace for broadcast radio stations is beyond the ability of Aloha Trust to predict.”⁴²

³⁰ Pursuant to 47 CFR § 0.459, we will not make the LOI Response available for public inspection and will treat the LOI Response as confidential to the extent that it contains specific financial information or “actual information on Aloha Trust’s divestiture plans.”

³¹ 2017 Bi-Annual Report at 2.

³² *Id.* at 3.

³³ *Id.* at 3.

³⁴ *Id.* at 4.

³⁵ LOI Response at 4.

³⁶ *Id.* at 5.

³⁷ 2017 Bi-Annual Report at 4.

³⁸ *Id.* at 4.

³⁹ Aloha Trust Opposition, Exh. A at 2.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 3.

⁴¹ 2017 Bi-Annual Report at 6.

⁴² *Id.* at 3.

Discussion. A petition to deny a renewal application must, pursuant to Section 309(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act),⁴³ provide properly supported allegations of fact that, if true, would establish a substantial and material question of fact that grant of the application would be prima facie inconsistent with Section 309(k) of the Act, which governs our evaluation of an application for license renewal.⁴⁴ Section 309(k) sets forth the statutory standard for license renewal, providing that the Commission must grant a license renewal application if, upon consideration of the application and pleadings, it finds, with respect to that station, that: (1) the station has served the public interest, convenience, and necessity; (2) there have been no serious violations of the Act or the Commission's rules; and (3) there have been no other violations which, taken together, constitute a pattern of abuse.⁴⁵ If the Commission finds, on the basis of the application, the pleadings filed, or other matters which it may officially notice, that there are no substantial and material questions of fact and that a grant of the application would be consistent with the standard of Section 309(k), it shall make the grant and deny the petition. If, however, the licensee fails to meet that standard, the Commission may deny the application—after notice and opportunity for a hearing under Section 309(e) of the Act—or grant the application “on terms and conditions that are appropriate, including a renewal for a term less than the maximum otherwise permitted.”⁴⁶ Section 309(k)(1) applies a “backwards-looking standard” which examines station performance and conduct during the preceding license term.⁴⁷

Failure to divest. While the Commission did not set a hard deadline for Aloha Trust to divest the Trust Stations, it likewise did not authorize a permanent trust arrangement. Such a permanent trust would contravene the terms of the Trust Agreement and *Divestiture Order* as well as represent a departure from the Commission's longstanding policy of authorizing divestiture trusts for the limited purpose of effectuating large transactions.⁴⁸ The Commission does not permit trusts to be “used as a mechanism for warehousing stations in excess of statutory limits on radio ownership that could otherwise be sold to potential competitors.”⁴⁹ Moreover, a permanent trust would violate Aloha Trust's express commitment, submitted with the divestiture applications and relied upon by the Commission in the *Divestiture Order*, to “consummate a sale or sales of each of the Stations *as soon as reasonably practicable* after the Closing

⁴³ 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1).

⁴⁴ 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(1) (Section 309k). The renewal standard was amended by Section 204(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). See *Implementation of Sections 204(a) and 204(c) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Broadcast License Renewal Procedures)*, Order, 11 FCC Rcd 6363 (1996).

⁴⁵ 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(1).

⁴⁶ 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(k)(2),(3).

⁴⁷ *Birach Broadcasting Group, Ltd.*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 5015, 5020, paras. 11-12 (2001) (*Birach*); see also *Fox Television Stations, Inc.*, 29 FCC Rcd 9564, 9571, n.40 (MB 2014).

⁴⁸ See, e.g., *Shareholders of AMFM, Inc.*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 16062, 16072, paras. 25-26 (2000) (stating that the use of divestiture trusts does not alleviate competitive concerns, but such concerns are mitigated where the trust is of temporary duration); *Jacor Communications, Inc.*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 6867, 6894-95, para. 35 (MB 1999) (holding that an insulated trust is appropriate for the limited purpose of facilitating a transaction).

⁴⁹ *Stockholders of Infinity Broadcasting Corp.*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 5012, 5042, para. 60 (1996) (“Therefore, we approve the trusts for the limited purpose of providing a means for the merger to proceed should the good faith and diligent efforts of the parties to close the divesting transactions fail. Moreover, we believe that it is appropriate to ensure that the trusts which give Westinghouse beneficial interests in stations that exceed the numerical ownership limits are short-term.”).

... at prices that render to [Clear Channel] the maximum consideration *reasonably attainable* . . .”⁵⁰ The Commission accepted this commitment together with the requirement that, if Aloha Trust were unable to complete the divestitures, it must submit a report to the Commission detailing (1) its efforts to sell the Trust Stations, (2) the reasons why the *required sales* were not consummated, and (3) recommendations for consummating the *required sales* without further delay.⁵¹

Upon review of Aloha Trust’s explanation for its failure to divest the Roanoke Trust Stations, we do not find persuasive the justification that the radio station market has not yet returned to “vibrant” pre-2008 levels. The Trust Agreement language concerning the “maximum consideration reasonably attainable” is a forward-looking reasonableness standard that does not include station prices that may have been attainable at some previous point in time under market conditions that no longer exist. Aloha Trust must take the market as it finds it, not as it wishes it to be. Similarly, Aloha Trust admits that it has received—but rejected—offers from third parties that it considered to be “below fair market value.”⁵² Broadly speaking, “fair market value,” is the price which “fairly may be believed that a purchaser in fair market conditions would have given.”⁵³ Therefore, “fair market value” is not the subjective value of the Roanoke Trust Stations to Aloha Trust or Capstar, but the value of those stations to prospective third party buyers who may not enjoy the similar economies of scale and/or joint operation. Finally, we note that Aloha Trust’s arguments regarding the difficulty of selling single stations does not apply to the two Roanoke Trust Stations.

Viewing the record as a whole, however, we do not find that Aloha Trust’s failure to date to divest the Roanoke Trust Stations raises a material and substantial question of fact that either the Roanoke or Capstar Trust Stations have not operated in the public interest during the previous license term. Since it became the licensee of the Trust Stations, Aloha Trust has engaged the services of a broker, taken steps to reach out to potential buyers, and completed the divestiture of 43 of the original 57 Trust stations. We are mindful of the fact that delayed renewal, or renewal for a term less than the maximum otherwise permitted, could paradoxically impair Aloha Trust’s present ability to expeditiously sell the Trust Stations. Therefore, we find it sufficient at this time to clarify Aloha Trust’s obligations and provide it with an opportunity to divest the Roanoke Trust Stations before the next renewal cycle.⁵⁴ We advise Aloha Trust to use the remainder of its current license term productively, in accordance with its obligation to sell the Trust Stations “as soon as reasonably practicable.”⁵⁵ Finally, we remind Aloha Trust and

⁵⁰ Trust Agreement § 4(a) (emphasis added).

⁵¹ *Divestiture Order*, 23 FCC Rcd at 1427; Trust Agreement § 4(g) (emphasis added).

⁵² LOI Response at 5.

⁵³ See, e.g., *Gulf Power Co. v. United States*, 187 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting *United States v. Miller*, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)) (discussing standard for determining just compensation for a taking in the context of eminent domain); Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fair_market_value (“The value of property as determined by the market place (or objective purchasers) rather than as determined by a subjective individual. This is what an informed and unpressured buyer would pay to an informed unpressured seller in an arms length transaction.”).

⁵⁴ For the same reasons, we conclude that it would be premature to “provide further incentives to expeditious sale of the remaining [Trust Stations],” as discussed in the LOI. See LOI at 3.

⁵⁵ 47 CFR § 73.1020 (setting an expiration date of October 1, 2019, for radio stations located in Virginia). In this respect, we note that during the next renewal cycle we may take into account any record evidence regarding specific offers that have been made for the Roanoke Trust Stations and Aloha Trust’s responses to those offers, as well as data regarding comparable sales in the Roanoke-Lynchburg market. Given that Aloha Trust’s current marketing strategy has not produced any results in the Roanoke-Lynchburg market for ten years, we may also examine whether it has adjusted this strategy, including whether it has made efforts to market the Roanoke Trust Stations to new (continued . . .)

Capstar that any communications between them are subject to inspection by the Commission upon request and may form part of the record during the next renewal cycle.⁵⁶

Market size calculation. With respect to 3 Daughters' request that we clarify the status of silent stations or unbuilt construction permits for multiple ownership purposes, we find that these issues are inappropriately raised here. To the extent that the Petition challenges the grant of the WSNV assignment application, it is untimely; we will not revisit the underlying multiple ownership analysis completed in that transaction.⁵⁷ Furthermore, we do not require a licensee, once its existing radio combination is found to be compliant with the multiple ownership rules, to subsequently divest merely because the total number of stations in the market drops below the numerical threshold that establishes the relevant radio market "tier" (in this case, 45).⁵⁸ The Commission has recognized that the impact of such a "springing" rule would be highly disruptive.⁵⁹ Finally, we do not perform multiple ownership analyses as part of the license renewal process.⁶⁰ Therefore, the Renewal Applications are not the proper forum for 3 Daughters' concerns regarding the appropriate station counting methodology in the Roanoke-Lynchburg Metro market.

Conclusion/Actions. We find that 3 Daughters fails to establish a substantial and material question of fact that grant of the Renewal Applications would be inconsistent with the public interest. We also find that Aloha Trust and Capstar are qualified to hold the Stations licenses and that grant of the Renewal Applications is consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition to Deny filed on September 1, 2011, by 3 Daughters Media, Inc. IS DENIED.

(Continued from previous page)

entrants and noncommercial entities as well as large commercial broadcasters who may already own the maximum number of stations in the market.

⁵⁶ Trust Agreement § 11(c).

⁵⁷ 47 CFR § 1.106(f). Grant of the WSNV(FM) assignment application, BALH-20110114AAA, was placed on public notice on March 15, 2011. *See Broadcast Actions*, Report No. 47443. No petitions to deny were filed against the WSNV(FM) assignment application, nor were any reconsideration petitions filed against the grant.

⁵⁸ *See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 13620, 13711, para. 234 (2003).

⁵⁹ *Id.*; *see also Michael Radio Group*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 23817, 23819, para. 3 (2004) ("We do not generally apply changes in ownership rules retroactively so as to require divestiture of existing combinations . . . and we did not do so when we revised the local radio rule.")

⁶⁰ 47 CFR § 73.3555, note 4 (stating that a multiple ownership analysis applies to applications for new stations, assignments or transfers, major changes to existing stations, and minor changes that implement a community of license change or creates new or increased concentration of ownership among commonly-owned, operated or controlled media properties).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the applications to renew the licenses of stations WJJS(FM), Roanoke, VA (File No. BRH-20110531AKT); WJXX(FM), Appomattox, VA (File No. File No. BRH-20110531AGK); WROV-FM, Martinsville, VA (File No. File No. BRH-20110531AKB); WSNV(FM), Salem, VA (File No. BRH-20110531AKW); WYYD(FM), Amherst, VA (File No. BRH-20110531ALB); WSFF(FM), Vinton, VA (File No. BRH-20110524ABG); and WSNZ(FM), Lynchburg, VA (File No. BRH-20110524ABH) ARE GRANTED.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Albert Shuldiner".

Albert Shuldiner
Chief, Audio Division
Media Bureau